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The Rights of Parentst
Robert J. Levy*
My topic today transcends doctrinal confines. My concern is
perpetuation of the family as the most important relationship in
our society-as the unit which provides, and should continue to
provide, the basic emotional and socializing experiences for our
children. Those functions can be served effectively, I believe, only
if the family is considered to be and is treated as an autonomous
unit, and if families are protected from untoward governmental
interference with their operations.' Yet the current "children's
rights" campaign, by increasing government intrusion into family
decisionmaking, has at least the potential to upset the traditional
social compact that undergirds these family-centered values. To
eliminate the threat, we must strive to maintain a stance of "family privacy"-a policy that families may not be supervised by
judicial or other agents of the state. I choose to call that stance
"Respect for Family Autonomy;" the people I call the "new child
savers" claim that I am simply an old-fashioned supporter of
"parental rights."
Let me start with a few "war stories" -because they are dramatic, because they make my points, and because "the other
t This paper was prepared for delivery at the 1976 Conference on Government Impact
in Family Life, conducted by the Family Research Center of Brigham Young University.
It was one of several relatively short addresses presented at one session of the conference;
as a result, many of its themes are not fully documented and developed, nor are its
proposals exhaustively defended. Versions of this paper will appear in the Proceedings of
the conference at Brigham Young University and in the Proceedings of the University of
Wisconsin Child Advocacy Conference.
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. A.B., 1952, Kenyon College. J.D., 1957,
University of Pennsylvania.
1. If the family relationship were not given primacy among social values, the proper
scope of governmental interference with family functions might well depend solely on an
empirical inquiry and a weighing of the costs to families and children of government
intervention against its benefits. But I would urge minimal government intrusion in family
decisionmaking even if an investigation showed that such intrusions would be, on balance,
of more help than harm. See particularly the text following note 15 infra. Yet the assignment of primacy to family values (as contrasted, say, with giving preference to individual
autonomy-a stance that might imply quite a different approach to judicial supervision
of parents' care of their children) obviously proceeds from a broader theory as to the
respective spheres of governmental and family authority and individual discretion. Delineation of that broader theory must await another occasion. It is worth noting, however.
that many of the recent scholarly explorations of the issues considered here seem to make
a similar if not identical assumption as to the importance of the family. See authorities
cited in note 19 infra.
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side" always makes use of them. Despite the differences in their
legal contexts, each of these cases provides an apt illustration of
a judicial disposition-most noticeable at the trial court level-to
intrude unduly upon the privacy of family decisionmaking; to put
it in the terms of my title, a judicial penchant for interfering with
the exercise of parent rights.
Consider first Kilgrow v. Kilgrow. The case arose as the
result of a dispute between a Catholic father and a Protestant
mother, living together as husband and wife, as to whether their
only child should be enrolled in a parochial or a public school.
The trial judge enjoined the mother from interfering with the
child's enrollment in parochial school because that educational
choice would be in the child's "best interests." The Alabama
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to determine the dispute. Consider also In re L.A. G.,1 in
which a Minnesota juvenile court judge, citing the Magna Charta
and Wisconsin v. Yoder,4 decided that he had jurisdiction to decide a dispute between a 15-year-old girl and her parents as to
whether it was better for her to go on a 2-year yacht trip which
the parents had been planning for 10 years, or to remain in Minnesota in close proximity to a boyfriend (of another race) of whom
the parents disapproved. Yet when the parents, seeing the jurisdictional handwriting on the wall, suggested as an alternative
plan that the child spend the next 2 years in the custody of a
maternal aunt in Philadelphia, the judge ordered that disposition
on grounds that the parents' plan for their child must be accepted
if it is "reasonable."
In Frizzell v. Frizzell,5 a father who had been separated from
his wife for 10 years under a separate maintenance decree was
unhappy with her decision to send their son, of whom she was the
legal guardian, to a private Catholic university; the trial court's
residual authority to supervise its decrees was invoked by the
father and the judge ordered the boy enrolled in a state college.
The appellate court agreed with the mother that the custodian
normally has authority to make decisions about the child's education; the trial judge's interference was nonetheless approved because the custodial parent's authority is subject to judicial con2. 268 Ala. 475, 107 So. 2d 855 (1958).
3. Hennepin County Dist. Ct. (Juv. Div.), Minn., Aug. 11, 1972. See also C. FOOTE,
R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 8-9 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter
cited as FOOTE, LEVY & SANDER].
4. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
5. 158 Cal. App. 652, 323 P.2d 188 (lst Dist. 1958).
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trol in the "best interests" of the child and in this case the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion. In another case involving a
post-divorce dispute,' a referee in a Minnesota Family Court
heard the father's motion to transfer custody of a 3-year-old child
from the mother. Because the father presented testimony that the
mother was keeping company with another man (a man, by the
way, whom she planned to marry as soon as his own divorce was
granted), the judge continued the case for 6 months and ordered
the probation service of the court to make unannounced visits to
the mother's home during that period. The order continued:
Effective immediately and during the period of continuance, [the wife] shall not permit any non-related male to reside
in [or] remain overnight in her household. Violation of any
condition hereunder shall be deemed sufficient grounds for an
immediate transfer of permanent custody to [the father.7
The order was amended to delete the quoted provision when the
mother appealed to the Family Court judge.
You may also be interested in the difficulties of the Raya
family.' Poor Chicano parents were obtaining a divorce after a 6year separation. They had not been able to obtain a iegal remedy
for their marital problems earlier because the local Legal Aid
Society had refused to handle divorces. Each parent had established a stable, nonmarital relationship with another person
(which had resulted in four more children for the mother, three
more for the father). Although a custody investigator reported
that the two children of the couple were well cared for, doing well
in school and should remain in the mother's custody, and although both parents planned to marry their informal mates when
the divorce was finalized, the trial judge referred the matter to
the juvenile court. The children were adjudicated neglected solely
because of the mother's extramarital liaison and were removed
from her home. (Interestingly enough, the children were originally placed with the maternal grandmother until, 3 months
later, the judge found that the grandmother wasn't married to her
"husband" either.) The appellate court reversed the neglect adjudication.
One last "war story." Some years ago, when I visited the New
York City Family Court, I was invited to share the bench with one
of the judges hearing truancy cases-unauthorized absence from
6. Unreported decree of Minnesota Family Court, on file with author.
7. Id.

8. In re Raya, 255 Cal. App. 2d 260, 63 Cal. Rptr. 252 (3d Dist. 1967).
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school was one of the grounds for juvenile court jurisdiction in
New York at that time. As the judge thumbed through the file, a
stray remark of a social worker concerning a spanking given by
the father to the child was noticed. With a remark to me about
the evils of battering children (but with no evidence whatever as
to the family relationship or the extent of the physical harm the
child had suffered, if any), the judge peremptorily ordered the
hearing converted to a neglect proceeding with at least the possibility that the child would be removed from the parent's home.
It should be clear that the cases I have described are disparate: in two of them, the parochial school dispute and the affair
of the yacht trip, a judge was asked to act as an arbitrator of an
intrafamily controversy (in one, between the parents, in the
other, between the parents and the child); in two cases, the Catholic college contretemps and the mother who began her new marriage prematurely, a judge who had "jurisdiction" over the parents and/or the child because of a prior judicial decree (of divorce
in one instance, of separate maintenance in the other) interfered
with the custodial parent's decisionmaking autonomy at the behest of the noncustodial parent; and finally, there were two juvenile court neglect cases-the context which in recent years has
most often inspired the charge that judges muck around entirely
too much in family life or, if you will, with parental rights. Although the contexts differ, the cases all illustrate a current norm
which is both unwise and dangerous: judicial over-involvement in
family affairs and parental decisionmaking.
It would not be difficult to multiply my "war stories." I
would not assert that the cases chosen are fairly representative
of judicial efforts concerning children and families. Yet I have
avoided choosing the rock-bottom "worst" cases simply to persuade you of the thesis which follows. Moreover, the cases are
typical in the sense that each periodic survey I make of recent
appellate decisions turns up one or more cases suitable for my
library. More important, the broad public support which the
child welfare movement commands leads me to believe that my
library will expand more rapidly in the future. Lest you conclude
that I overestimate the risk of wholesale intervention, consider
the recent suggestion made by Patricia Wald, a widely known and
respected child's advocate. After cataloguing a long list of denials
of rights to children, Wald contends:
[I]n situations where the interests of the child (no matter his
age) and the parents are apt to conflict or a serious adverse
impact on the child is likely to be the consequence of unilateral
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parental actions, it is now argued that the child's interests deserve representation by an independent advocate before a neutral decisionmaker.9
I believe that we must take account of the terrible risks to private
family decisionmaking that current legal doctrines and the current fascination with "children's rights" pose; we must pay close
attention to the extent to which current practices of judges in fact
maximize those risks; and we must create corrective doctrines-judicially or, preferably, legislatively-which adequately
protect the interests of families.
I should add a note of caution. I am not one of those (there
are a few) who believe that it is under all circumstances improper
for judges to intrude upon parental decisionmaking. Rather, I
would draft rules that carefully, overtly, and severely circumscribe judges' power to do so. You will no doubt note that since I
am thus obligated to draft quite specific statutory guidelines, and
since some family situations which merit intervention will inevitably escape through the legislative interstices, I have weakened
my defenses to the impact of the "war stories" of "child savers."
The last time I argued this thesis I heard about the mother who
liked to iron her daughter's dresses-while the daughter wore
them. (Indeed, the impact of that case on the audience induced
my decision to begin this talk with a few "war stories" of my
own.) I recognize that the policies I recommend will inevitably
produce cases in which parents make family decisions that are
not in the child's best interests although a judge would make the
"right" decision with little long-range impact on that individual
family; these policies will also produce some cases in which parents will behave toward their children in a fashion that everyone
at this Conference would believe probably places the child at
present or future psychological, perhaps even physical, risk (although I doubt that our consensus as to behavior that produces
such risk would hold among all socioeconomic, ethnic, and racial
classes). Nonetheless, doctrines that permit us to reach these
cases by authoritarian intervention also permit and encourage a
larger amount of intervention of which all of us, or at least all but
the most recalcitrant "child savers" among us, would disapprove.
9. P. Wald, Making Sense Out of the Rights of Youth, 4 Hwmtsi RIGHTS 13, 17 (1974).
I hasten to add that Wald later makes sophisticated adjustments to this expansiv principle. Thus, after outlining a number of narrowly drawn procedural and substantive rights
children should enjoy, to none of which I would object, she comments: "No one envisions
allowing children to run to court for an injunction whenever their parents lay down unacceptable rules of conduct." Id. at 21.
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Since legal doctrines should be adopted only after assessing their
costs as well as their benefits, I would opt to save more families
from judges even if it means that some parents will be permitted
to sacrifice their children. Thus, I prefer to maximize "family
autonomy" or, if you still insist, to preserve "parental rights."
II
Although it may belabor the obvious, let me quickly outline
the justifications for preferring "family autonomy."
In the neutral arbitrator cases (the parochial school dispute
and the almost aborted yacht trip), judicial noninterference helps
to reinforce the notions that the family is the basic social institution, that the family unit will be undermined if outsiders, especially judges, make decisions for it. The only alternative is to
assume that parents will take the family's needs and their children's interests and wishes into account, and to permit the parents to make decisions in as familially democratic or parentally
fascistic a fashion as they choose, but without outside interference. Moreover, in general (again a warning: not in every case),.
parents will make better decisions than judges since they are
more familiar with the psychological and other dynamics of the
family than judges can become through judicial processes.
The themes are nicely expressed in the Kilgrow case:
It seems to us, if we should hold that equity has jurisdiction
in this case such holding will open wide the gates for settlement
in equity of all sorts and varieties of intimate family disputes
concerning the upbringing of children. The absence of cases
dealing with the question indicates a reluctance of courts to
assume jurisdiction in disputes arising out of the intimate family circle. It does not take much imagination to envision the
extent to which explosive differences of opinion between parents
as to the proper upbringing of their children could be brought
into court for attempted solution.
In none of our cases has the court intervened to settle a
controversy between unseparated parents as to some matter incident to the well-being of the child, where there was no question presented as to which parent should have custody. In all of
our cases the real question has been which parent should properly be awarded custody. Never has the court put itself in the
place of the parents and interposed its judgment as to the course
which otherwise amicable parents should pursue in discharging
their parental duty. . ..
The inherent jurisdiction of courts of equity over infants is
a matter of necessity, coming into exercise only where there has
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been a failure of that natural power and obligation which is the
province of parenthood. It is a jurisdiction assumed by the
courts only when it is forfeited by a natural custodian incident
to a broken home or neglect, or as a result of a natural custodian's incapacity, unfitness or death. It is only for compelling
reason that a parent is deprived of custody of his or her child
t0

The same note was struck in People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson," a
case in which the parents could not agree as to the religious training of the child. The trial judge and two sets of appellate judges
seemed to agree that Mr. Sisson's behavior was "extreme and
unreasonable" and that "it would be difficult for the average man
of sound mental balance, education and clear understanding of
the nature and necessity of family unity, to dissent from this
conclusion."' 2 Nonetheless, the court of appeals ordered the
mother's writ of habeas corpus, designed to constrain the father's
behavior, dismissed:
The court cannot regulate by its processes the internal affairs of the home. Dispute between parents when it does not
involve anything immoral or harmful to the welfare of the child
is beyond the reach of the law. The vast majority of matters
concerning the upbringing of children must be left to the conscience, patience and self restraint of father and mother. No end
of difficulties would arise should judges try to tell parents how
to bring up their children. Only when moral, mental and physical conditions are so bad as seriously to affect the health or
morals of children should the courts be called upon to act.' 3
In divorce-custody and juvenile court neglect cases, additional considerations can be isolated. A democratic society must
provide freedom from authoritarian interference by governmental
agencies-that freedom must be maximized even if it entails
leaving children to their parents' sometimes not very tender mercies. Moreover there is now an accumulation of evidence (of
which I have barely given you a taste) that the absence of a
constraining doctrine of "family autonomy" leads frequently to
trial court and juvenile court excesses-unnecessary, sometimes
outrageous, intrusions upon family decisionmaking as well as flagrant floutings of common sense. There is also a substantial body
10. Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 268 Ala. 475, 479, 107 So.2d 885, 888 (1958).
11. 271 N.Y. 285, 2 N.E.2d 660 (1936).
12. People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 246 App. Div. 151, 155, 285 N.Y.S. 41, 44-45 (3d
Dep't 1936).
13. 271 N.Y. at 287-88, 2 N.E.2d at 661.
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of evidence indicating that, while trial judges are considerably
more interventionist than appellate court opinions suggest is appropriate, control by appellate review is not an adequate safeguard: appeals are uncommon since the populations at risk lack
money and social sophistication. It is clear, moreover, that the
families at risk are usually lower class, ethnically or racially different from the personnel of the intervention agencies, and they
often do not share the middle class values that those agencies
believe (on the basis of very little evidence) are vital to healthy
child development.
Transcending these considerations in every context, in my
view, is the need to control judicial discretion. In the neutral
arbitrator cases-as the yacht trip decision indicates-any exercise of jurisdiction entails substantial amounts of discretion at
two levels: (1) in the original decision to intervene, and (2) in the
details of the judicial disposition once intervention is permissible.
In the divorce-custody cases, the guiding shibboleth-the "best
interests of the child"-hardly constrains trial judge discretion.' 4
And the juvenile court's neglect jurisdiction has traditionally
been so broad and so vague as to authorize juvenile court judges
to intervene in family affairs virtually whenever they want to.
Consider the Minnesota Juvenile Court Act's definitions of neglect:
"Neglected child" means a child:
(a) Who is abandoned by his parent, guardian, or other
custodian; or
(b) Who is without proper parental care because of the
faults or habits of his parent, guardian, or other custodian; or
(c) Who is without necessary subsistence, education or
other care necessary for his physical or mental health or morals
because his parent, guardian, or other custodian neglects or refuses to provide it; or
(d) Who is without the special care made necessary by his
physical or mental condition because his parent, guardian, or
other custodian neglects or refuses to provide it; or
(e) Whose occupation, behavior, condition, environment
or associations are such as to be injurious or dangerous to himself or others; or . ..
(g) Whose parent, guardian, or custodian has made arrangements for his placement in a manner detrimental to the
welfare of the child or in violation of the law . . . .
14. See generally FooTE, LEVY & SANDER 400-430.
15. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015(10) (Supp. 1975).
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Clearly, such vague phrases are necessary if juvenile court
judges are to have authority.to intervene in all cases in which they
could conceivably be useful. But it is also clear that such authority has often been used where it shouldn't have been, and has
often resulted in unquestionably unjustifiable judicial impositions on individual and family decisions. These results, I believe,
are the inevitable byproducts of the vagueness of the legislative
direction. Virtually unconstrained discretion permits, even fosters, the imposition by a judge of his own personal values upon
the litigants before him. Consider In re Woodward," a guardianship case (jurisdiction was thus not in issue) in which a Catholic
stepfather was litigating against his deceased wife's Protestant
parents for custody of the child. An unusually frank trial judge
commented:
There being no disputed question of law or fact herein, the
Court turns to the consideration of the exercise of its judicial
discretion. Although a court is charged with the duty of dispensing even-handed justice in accordance with law, and makes its
best and sincere effort to do so, it is recognized that where a
decision rests upon judicial discretion, to some extent the parties are at the mercy of the court's background and experience.
And that is something very difficult for the parties, through
their counsel, to meet. They cannot cross-examine the Court on
his life history and personal biases and prejudices, many, if not
most, of which he himself may not realize he possesses. Nonetheless, in some measure in matters of this sort the background
and experience of the Court affect his decisions very much as
though a highly respected and competent expert witness had
taken the stand and testified concerning the principles involved,
with the evidence standing undenied and unimpeached. Respondent's counsel seem to have recognized this in making one
of their arguments personal to the Court's family.' t
Or consider the comment of a California legislative committee
about divorce-custody litigation:
The exercise of this discretion cannot be considered simply as a
legal function, no matter how learned in the law a judge may
be. We must recognize that the discretion exercised by a trial
judge is far less a product of his learning than of his personality
and temperament, his background and interests, his biases and
prejudices, conscious or unconscious. Hence, it is both necessary
16. 102 N.Y.S. 2d 490 (Surr. Ct., Monroe County 1951).
17. Id. at 494.
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and practicable to attempt to give more definite substance to
the generalizations that creep into our laws and into our cases. 8
Imposition of personal values-which a discretionary system
cannot avoid-is especially dangerous in the contexts with which
we are concerned. In neutral arbitrator cases, a judge can eliminate from his calculus neither his own feelings as to the obedience
children owe their parents nor his feelings as to the choices the
parents have made or are planning to make. It is not uncommon
for a judge in divorce-custody cases to impose not only his own
values as to child-rearing on the litigants before him, but also his
unresolved feelings about his own divorce. Most dangerously, the
juvenile court judge is accustomed (if not invited by the legislature) to impose his middle class values on a population which, by
and large, does not share those values. To give one homely illustration: I find it difficult, at best, to predict that my children will
turn out better because I'm too guilty to spank them than will the
children of an old-fashioned Eastern European parent who believes in the virtues of the belt or even the rod. But under the
typical discretionary juvenile court-neglect statute, if the judge
is surer of his "no-spank" methods than I am of mine (and the
New York Family Court judge I mentioned certainly was!), the
belt or rod father may be in deep trouble.
Discretion also gives the judge permission to vent his wrath
on the recalcitrant people who regularly appear before him but
refuse to "better themselves" in accordance with the personal
standards he shares with his probation officer colleagues. If you
accept the system's premises, of course, the judge often has good
cause to be angry. But the bottom line is that a system created
to benefit children often results in punitive expeditions against
the parents as well as the children: placements in foster homes
for little reason, with the expectation not that parental attitudes
and behaviors will change, but only that the children will be
further alienated; and unnecessary terminations of parental
rights. I will probably not be able to persuade you from the evidence I have time to present today that such punitive expeditions
occur; but I can assure you that in recent years an increasing body
of secondary literature attests to their existence and gives some
indication of their frequency.9
18.

CAL. ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON JUDICIARY, FINAL REPORT RELATING To DOMESTIC

(1965).
19. See, e.g., FOOTE, LEvY & SANDER 54-72; M. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of
"Neglected Children". A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985 (1975);
Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest ?, 43 HAIv. EDUc. REv. 599 (1973).
RELATIONS 153
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Wald's approach to some of these problems, proceeding from
quite different premises than my own, deserves careful attention:
[A] fundamental reason why children's rights has emerged as
a serious topic at all is the erosion in confidence in the family
[reliably] to meet all the needs of the child. . . Intact families whose members love and respect each other would not be
likely to disintegrate if there were to be a different allocation of
rights and privileges within the family. I would wager that most
strong family units already allow their children the freedom we
are talking about. It is the borderline, shaky or unstable family
structures that might split open when the lines of authority
become more blurred. These are also the high risk families in
which abuse and exploitation of children are most likely to
occur, and where children most need an affirmation of their
basic rights. Subconsciously, we may worry that parents will say
"why should I feed, house and educate you if you won't do what
I say; if, in short, I can't control you?" . . . I do not think we
have any evidence that the viability of the family will be jeopardized by more freedom for the children or, indeed, that the
continuation of its present rigid power structure is essential to
preservation at all. ....-0
In the first place, there is no evidence that "unstable" families
(that is, those most likely to "split open" because of judicial
intervention) are also abusive and exploitative-unless those
phrases describe parents with whose childcare decisions the author disagrees. It may well be true (although, once again, we have
no accurate information on the subject) that "strong family
units" allow their children considerable freedom; and certainly
there is no evidence that weak or strong family units will "split
open" if a different legal regime were to be instituted or if judges
in occasional "low visibility" cases were to displace parental authority. But the argument simply misses the point. Even if all
family units could withstand the occasional impositions and idiosyncrasies of juvenile court discretion, believers in a democratic
and pluralistic society should be unwilling to give so much unbridled discretion to judges. Even if the issue were posed strictly in
terms of weighing costs and benefits, my own experience with
juvenile courts and trial judges in custody and intrafamily
dispute cases leads me to conclude-on the basis of very impressionistic rather than quantified data-that the demonstrated
abuses of discretionary jurisdiction outweigh its benefits. But we
20. P. Wald, supra note 9, at 23-24.
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must add in the balance the independent social value of family
autonomy and the necessity to constrain the judiciary. With these
weighty considerations buttressing it, the case for "parental
rights" seems to me to be overwhelming.
Children's rights advocates often respond to these contentions by claiming that I ignore the state's traditional parens
patriaerole toward children. Perhaps I do. But I typically call to
my defense another Latin phrase: if judges and lawyers are to
protect children from the depredations of their parents, quis custodes custodiet?
III

It remains only to sketch, quickly and inadequately, some of
the implications of the notion of "family autonomy." As you have
surmised from the variety of my "war stories," I would apply the
notion across the board to every aspect of family law doctrine.
Consider just a few of the legal contexts in which parental
decisionmaking and judicial discretion have often in the past
come in conflict.
The courts should be denied authority to intervene in the
neutral arbitrator-intrafamily dispute cases unless the parental
behavior falls below minimal community standards of adequacy
as articulated in those considerably narrowed jurisdictional definitions of parental neglect that "family privacy" principles would
permit. Because children, parents and nonmembers of the family
with whom they deal often need legal guidance, the legislature
should provide rules that would determine after-the-fact litigation but would not allow a judge to make ad hoc family decisions
for the child and the parents. In this fashion the value choices
that should be made can be made overtly and with careful attention to the intricacy and subtle variety of the issues: modifying
policies, perhaps, as the factual context changes slightly. Consider the problem of medical care for an unemancipated minor.
For the Juvenile Justice Standards Project, a joint endeavor of
the Institute of Judicial Administration and the American Bar
Association, 2 ' Professor Feld and I are drafting legislative rules
that address the following separable questions: at what age can
21. For other endeavors attributable, at least in part, to the Standards Commission
see, e.g., The Ellery C. Decision: A Case Study of JudicialRegulation of Juvenile Status
Offenders, INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1975); Note, ContemporaryStudiesPro.
ject: Funding the Juvenile Justice System in Iowa, 60 IowA L. REV. 1149 (1975). See also
M. Wald, supra note 19. Neither the policies described here nor other standards in "The
Rights of Minors" volume have been finally approved by the Commission.
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a child decide for himself, without prior parental consent, that he
needs or wants a specific form of medical treatment; at what age,
or under what (if any) circumstances, must a doctor notify parents that he is performing a given medical procedure on their
child even if their consent need not be obtained; under what
circumstances are parents liable for the costs of a medical procedure. We believe that the legislative rules should be mechanical
and should vary with the danger of the procedure and its importance to the child. Thus, an abortion should be available to a child
without parental notice or consent after age 14 and, perhaps, at
some earlier age, with parental notice but without parental consent; but a sterilization should never be permissible, even with
parental consent, prior to the age of 18 because the procedure is
irremediable and the risks of "involuntary consent," by both parents and child, are too great. A child should be able to obtain drug
abuse treatment without notice to or consent of parents, but only
a limited number of crisis psychological treatments should be
available without notice to parents and without parental consent.
Parents should be financially liable only for those medical procedures for which the legislative rules require their prior consent.
Divorce-custody law and practice would also profit if legislatures and judges gave greater deference to "family privacy" values. Family court judges should not be permitted to interfere with
voluntary parental decisions as to the child's post-divorce custody-even to appoint a guardian ad litem for the child. The
juvenile court is always available, of course, if the prospective
custodial parent neglects the child; and separating the state's
divorce and neglect jurisdiction provides parents and children
with some protection from too intrusive judges just when intrafamily strife is most likely to make the family appear from the
outside to need intervention.? The reasons were articulated by a
British study some years ago:
Some people think that there are many instances where
better arrangements could have been made for the children;
other people think that these cases are few . ...
It is, however, important to keep the following considerations in mind. . . .The question in almost all cases is that of
deciding which of the parents is to be responsible for the child's
upbringing, and in which home the child is to live. However
unsatisfactory some homes may appear to be, it is generally
22. See generally FOOTE, LEVY & SANDER 447-48.

706

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1976:

accepted that such conditions can often co-exist with strong ties
of affection between parent and child. The alternative to leaving
the child in the charge of the parent would be to try to find a
suitable relative or friend who is willing to undertake the child,
or failing that, that the local authority [the welfare department] should receive the child into care; and it is obvious that
conditions would have to be really bad before one of these
courses could be justified. Moreover, we consider that in the
great majority of cases parents are the best judges of their children's welfare. Where they are agreed upon the arrangements
for the children, very strong evidence indeed would be required
to justify setting aside their proposals."
To protect families from the vagueness of the "best interest"
doctrine applicable to initial custody decisions, the legislature
should enact a series of presumptions, very difficult to rebut, that
would guide judicial decisions in contested cases, and incidentally, discourage contests. Legislation should make original custody decisions very close to final unless the parents change the
child's custody by agreement. 4 At a given age-at 12 perhaps, or
14 if I am feeling like a parental fascist-the legislature should
instruct the judge to leave the custody decision to the child. To
further constrain trial judges, the legislature should add to the
divorce-custody statute a direction that trial judges must decide
"to which of the parents" the child should be awarded.25 By denying divorce jurisdiction judges authority to award custody to a
third person, such a statutory provision may discourage such
judges from confusing their powers with those of juvenile courts.
Finally, the legislatures should deprive judges of authority to
review the decisions of the custodial parent as to all issues but
visitation by the noncustodial parent. 26 The Catholic college case
would not arise in my system. 27
I do not have time this morning to explore in detail the impli23. ROYAL COMM'N ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, Cmnd. No. 9678, paras. 370-371 (1956).

24. An increasing number of judges and commentators seem to agree with this proposition. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 202 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1972); Bodenheimer, The Rights
of Children and the Crisis in Custody Litigation: Modification of Custody in and out of
State, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 495 (1975). However, that does not make me confident that
the other propositions will also be eventually accepted.
25. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(2) (Supp. 1975).
26. Cf. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
37-38 (1973) (urging that even visitation should be at the sole discretion of the custodial
parent).
27. These issues are explored in greater detail at FooTE, LEVY & SANDER 388-438;

Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody Adjudication: An Effort to Rely
on Social Science Data in FormulatingLegal Policies, 4 LAW & Soc. REV. 167 (1969).
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cations of a notion of "family privacy" for the law of neglect. But
I can refer you to some excellent recent examinations of the topic
by Professor Michael Wald u and Professor Mnookin." Not surprisingly, both authors recognize the risks and the incidence of
juvenile court abuse of discretionary jurisdictional standards and
recommend constraints on judicial power. It is fair to say that the
logic of my statement of the family autonomy principle would
compel me to adopt even narrower definitions of neglect (e.g.,
eliminating "emotional neglect" as a ground for intervention)
than does Professor Wald; yet I am informed that his relatively
modest proposals have already brought the child welfare lobby to
the trenches. I would eliminate entirely a number of the typical
definitions of neglect-such as the reference in the Minnesota Act
to the parents' "faults or habits,""0 and the provision directing
attention to the child whose "environment or associations are
such as to be dangerous to himself or others. . .. ,,31 These provisions, and others like them, give juvenile court judges virtually
unreviewable discretion to intervene in too many family situations where the need for judicial supervision cannot be justified
and the consequences of judicial supervision have too often been
disastrous. In addition, we should draft all jurisdictional provisions narrowly-knowing that some children who need help will
thus escape our net, but also knowing that juvenile court judges,
encouraged by their "child saving" fantasies and emboldened by
the "children's rights" movement, will in any event interpret the
jurisdictional provisions at least as expansively as the latest appellate court decision will allow.
28.
29.
30.
31.

M. Wald, supra note 19.
Mnookin, supra note 19.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015(10)(b) (Supp. 1975).
Id. § 260:15(10)(e).

